Polygamy, equal rights and serious public interests in expulsion

Naturalisation can be excluded even where the length of residence, language skills and income are generally sufficient. § 11 StAG lists, among other grounds, being married to multiple spouses at the same time, conduct demonstrating disregard for equal rights for men and women, and certain particularly serious public interests in expulsion. These grounds have different requirements. Neither every unusual family situation nor every residence-law problem is sufficient. What matters is the actual civil status, the person's own conduct and the precise statutory reference.

The statutory grounds for exclusion must not be conflated. In the case of polygamy, the first question is whether the applicant is personally married to several people at the same time. For equal rights, the issue is what the person's own conduct reveals about their recognition of equal rights. For public interests in expulsion, the focus is on conduct that threatens security or relates to violence.

The fact that the circumstances may overlap does not change this. A family's circumstances may, for example, give rise to an examination of civil status and, additionally, of conduct towards individual family members' self-determination. However, the authority must establish the specific conditions for each ground for exclusion on which it relies. An unclear family situation does not replace evidence of coercion or violence. § 11 StAG

These grounds also apply alongside the requirements relating to criminal convictions and commitment to the constitution. A conviction does not always have to exist for conduct to be relevant under § 11. Conversely, the authority must not, without further reasons, also classify an act with criminal relevance as disregard for equal rights or as an activity threatening the state.

Since 27 June 2024, polygamy and conduct demonstrating disregard for equal rights have been expressly included in § 11 StAG. This new provision replaced the previous additional requirement in §§ 8 and 10 to be integrated into German living conditions. That former requirement does not establish an additional present-day condition alongside the current law.

For an older application, § 40a StAG does not establish that the previous exclusion rules generally continue to apply. This transitional provision concerns only the more favourable provisions on securing subsistence specified there. The assessment of civil status and conduct must therefore proceed on the basis of the law that actually applies.

§ 11 sentence 1 number 3 letter a StAG concerns a person who is married to several spouses at the same time. A second marriage entered into successively after the first has validly ended does not fulfil this condition. The timing and legal transitions are therefore essential:

• When was the first marriage entered into?

• When did it legally end?

• When did the further marriage begin?

With foreign marriages and divorces, a further question may arise as to whether, and with what effect, they are recognised under the rules applicable in Germany. Not every document headed “divorce” produces the same result without further examination. A religious marriage may likewise have different legal significance depending on the applicable law. A blanket assumption that religious marriages either never count or always count is incorrect.

We organise the available certificates into a coherent chronology. Relevant documents may include marriage certificates, full divorce decisions, evidence of their effectiveness or final and binding status and, where applicable, recognition decisions. Where a marriage ended through death, the corresponding evidence is important. Translations must reliably convey the content.

We identify any gaps specifically. A missing official copy of a decision is different from a divorce that has not yet been completed. Equally, the date of a court decision must be distinguished from the date on which it takes legal effect. The naturalisation authority needs to establish the actual legal position, not merely receive a general statement that an earlier relationship ended long ago.

We clarify the nationality-law significance before family-law steps are taken on the basis of assumptions alone. The existing status must first be clarified. Dissolving a marriage can have significant personal, maintenance and parental consequences. A careful assessment shows what problem actually exists and which evidence the authority needs.

If one of several marriages is validly ended, the condition of being married to multiple spouses at the same time may cease to apply. The actual legal effectiveness and evidence of the current civil status are decisive. However, this does not necessarily resolve every further question. Specific past acts of coercion or continuing conduct contrary to equal rights must be assessed separately. Conversely, a former multiple marriage must not be treated without examination as a permanently continuing civil status. The authority must take changes into account and distinguish between the current marriage-related impediment and other possible grounds for exclusion. A legally effective change must therefore be fully evidenced, without assuming that it automatically has further consequences.

Not every person in a polygamous marital situation is themselves married to several spouses. If a man has two wives, each wife may be married only to that one man. The direct condition under letter a therefore cannot simply be applied to everyone involved.

For partners, we separately examine under letter b whether their own conduct shows disregard for equal rights. This must be assessed individually. Simply establishing that someone is a spouse in a polygamous marriage does not conclude this assessment.

Voluntariness, dependencies, actual freedom of choice and the person's own conduct may be relevant. Someone who is themselves subject to coercion or wishes to leave a disadvantageous situation is in a different position from someone who actively enforces the subordination of others. Another person's conduct must not automatically be attributed to them. The assessment must relate to the individual applicant for naturalisation.

Article 3 of the Basic Law guarantees equal rights for women and men. § 11 StAG builds on this and requires that the person's own conduct must not disregard this equality. Mere formal agreement is therefore insufficient if the way the person actually lives denies other people's fundamental equal rights. Basic Law, Article 3

The purpose is not to prescribe the same division of responsibilities for every family. One person may voluntarily undertake most of the childcare while the other works. Different personal ideas about relationships are not, in themselves, a ground for exclusion either. What matters is whether those involved can make their decisions with equal legal freedom.

Problems may arise, by contrast, where a wife is fundamentally denied the right to work solely because of her gender, or female relatives are forcibly excluded from social life. The same applies to violence used to enforce a claimed male authority. The specific act and its significance for equal rights must be established in each case; not every dispute in a relationship supports such a conclusion.

Invoking a religious or cultural tradition does not justify violating equal rights. On the other hand, a religious way of life does not create grounds for blanket suspicion. The Basic Law protects faith and conscience as well as equal rights. The assessment must therefore distinguish between personally chosen rules of conduct and enforcing an inferior legal status on other people.

Social customs illustrate this. A particular greeting may have different reasons, such as health, personal boundaries or an assessment based on gender. The current wording of the law does not prescribe a handshake as an independent requirement for naturalisation. If specific conduct prompts an assessment, the motives and context must be clarified; an outward act alone must not mechanically replace every further evaluation.

Nor do clothing, religious affiliation or the language used within a family automatically establish disregard for equal rights. Actual decisions and actions are what matter. Conversely, specific acts of coercion do not become irrelevant because they take place in private. The statutory assessment expressly also covers conduct that denies the equal status of women and men in their life together.

An act may lead to a small fine and still be relevant to naturalisation from another perspective. Although § 12a StAG contains thresholds below which criminal convictions may be disregarded, this provision is not a general permission to ignore the underlying conduct for all other requirements.

If, for example, a violent offence expresses a fundamental disregard for equal rights, § 11 must be examined independently. Special naturalisation rules concerning criminal offences also apply to certain motives that deny people's equal human worth. A careful distinction must be drawn between the criminal court's findings and the additional assessment under nationality law. Which criminal decisions are taken into account? provides further details.

The threshold for minor convictions must also be distinguished from a prohibition on use. Where a conviction has been expunged or is eligible for expungement, § 51 BZRG generally also protects against adverse reliance on the underlying act. It cannot be used again merely by relabelling the assessment as a question of equal rights. Whether a statutory exception under § 52 BZRG applies must be established separately. Expungement and limits on use explains the details.

Conversely, merely serving a sentence or paying a fine does not prove a changed attitude. Where past conduct prompts a current assessment, later developments may be relevant. Whether the statutory exclusion still exists at the time of the decision must be answered on the basis of the specific circumstances. The provision contains no fixed period after which every disregard for equal rights is automatically resolved.

§ 54 AufenthG contains numerous different public interests in expulsion. However, § 11 sentence 1 number 2 StAG refers exclusively to § 54 subsection 1 number 2 or 4 AufenthG. This is a specific selection. Other offences or breaches of duties under residence law may be relevant for other reasons, but this reference alone does not turn them into the exclusion from naturalisation specified there.

Number 2 concerns threats to the free democratic basic order or Germany's security. Subject to the statutory conditions, this includes in particular support for terrorism and the preparation of certain terrorist offences. In the situations specified there, the provision also takes into account a recognisable and credible distancing from conduct that threatens security.

Number 4 covers participation in violence in pursuit of political or religious aims, as well as public calls for violence and threats of violence. A mere difference of opinion or peaceful participation in a demonstration does not fulfil this condition. Here too, the relevant personal conduct must be established. The current wording of § 54 AufenthG is decisive.

A public interest in expulsion and an expulsion order actually issued are different things. For expulsion, further residence-law requirements must be examined, particularly the balancing exercises prescribed by law. Under nationality law, by contrast, the exclusion specified in § 11 may already apply where the particularly serious public interest in expulsion referred to there exists.

It therefore cannot safely be inferred from a continuing residence title that naturalisation is possible. Equally, refusal of naturalisation does not automatically mean that expulsion or deportation must follow. The two procedures have different requirements and legal consequences. Each decision must be understood according to its own legal standard.

§ 11 sentence 2 also extends this security standard to certain people who are not generally subject to the Residence Act and to the Swiss nationals and family members specified there. Rights of free movement therefore do not remove every security assessment under nationality law. Nor do they change the duty to establish a specific ground for exclusion individually.

When the authority asks for clarification, we first establish which of the three assessments is involved. A civil-status problem requires different evidence from an allegation of a specific act of violence. If equal rights are raised, it must be clear which conduct by the applicant is meant and why it is said to demonstrate a fundamental disregard for equal rights.

General achievements in integration do not resolve these questions on their own. Many years of employment may describe the person's circumstances, but they replace neither a missing divorce document nor a response to a specific allegation of violence. The next step therefore depends on the actual obstacle. For past extremist support, the separate article on credible renunciation provides further information; for a criminal decision, see the overview of criminal offences and investigations.