Requirements: application, waiting period and sufficient reason for delay

Whether an action for failure to act is an option for an outstanding naturalisation application does not depend solely on the number of months that have passed. First, an application must exist. The statutory waiting period, the absence of a substantive decision and the reasons for the delay must then be examined. The general requirements for court proceedings also apply. This article explains the individual questions to be assessed and shows which documents provide useful evidence for that assessment.

§ 75 VwGO applies to an application for an administrative act or an administrative objection. In naturalisation matters, it must have become clear to the competent administration that the person concerned wishes to acquire German citizenship through naturalisation. The authority must have been given an opportunity to examine this specific request before it becomes the subject of an action.

Not every earlier conversation meets this requirement. An enquiry about the requirements, a request for an application form or booking an appointment may merely be preparatory. What matters is the actual substance of the communication. Someone who only wanted to know whether an application would have prospects of success has not necessarily already applied for naturalisation. Conversely, a letter clearly recognisable as an application must not be disregarded simply because the authority classified it incorrectly internally.

For families, it must be clear for whom naturalisation is being requested. Merely mentioning a child as a family member is not in every case equivalent to submitting a separate application or an application for naturalisation together with a parent. Authority to act as a representative and any necessary declarations must also be taken into account. An action can only meaningfully build on the request actually put to the authority. Details of submission are covered in Application, digital access and proof of receipt.

An application may already have been submitted even though evidence is still missing. The start of the waiting period must therefore not automatically be postponed to the day on which the authority considers, in its own assessment, that all documents are sufficient. Whether a communication already qualifies as an application is assessed by reference to its content and the relevant procedural requirements. Whether missing evidence justifies waiting longer is a separate question.

This distinction prevents two opposite errors. Applicants cannot trigger every subsequent waiting period simply by sending an unintelligible message. Equally, authorities cannot treat every recognisably submitted application as legally non-existent until the very last update to income documents. Submitting further documents later therefore does not automatically reset all procedural considerations from the beginning.

This also applies when a residence title changes. The date on which a title suitable for § 10 StAG is held may matter for deciding the entitlement without cancelling out the earlier receipt of the application. Similarly, years of residence that can already be counted must be distinguished from the suitability of the current title. Further information is provided in What residence status is required at the time of naturalisation?.

For our assessment, we need the complete application and evidence of transmission. A draft saved in a portal does not prove that it was sent. An acknowledgement of receipt, by contrast, can record the date and, where applicable, the scope of the submission. If there is no acknowledgement, other evidence may be considered. What matters is being able to establish as reliably as possible what reached which body and when.

Under § 75 sentence 2 VwGO, an action generally cannot be brought before three months have elapsed since the application was made or the administrative objection lodged. This waiting period is intended to give the administration an initial opportunity to make its own decision. It means calendar months, not a flat period of ninety days. The specific calculation must take account of the relevant date of receipt and the applicable rules for calculating time limits.

There is no general special waiting period of six or twelve months for naturalisation in place of § 75 VwGO. Such longer periods must not be confused with authorities' experience of typical processing times. § 75 VwGO also applies to citizenship proceedings.

The law permits an action before three months have elapsed if special circumstances in the case require a shorter period. This needs specific justification. The mere fact that naturalisation is personally important applies to almost every applicant. Nor does a desired date chosen by the applicant satisfy the statutory exception. What matters is a special interest in earlier access to the court that can be objectively substantiated.

We substantiate particular urgency with the specific facts and supporting evidence. What legal or factual position is at risk of being lost? When would that happen? Why can the disadvantage not be avoided by another step? We also assess whether an earlier claim could resolve the problem or a separate application for interim relief would be needed.

Exceptional cases must not be confused with a general recommendation to bring proceedings as early as possible. A premature action can create procedural and cost-related difficulties. Whether the subsequent passage of time resolves the problem during the proceedings and whether the court initially stays the case depends on the particular circumstances. We prepare your claim without relying on such a later development.

§ 75 VwGO concerns an outstanding decision. An acknowledgement of receipt or a message stating that the file is still being examined does not end that situation. The same normally applies to a request for further documents or notice of an intended rejection with an opportunity to comment. Such letters may be relevant to the reason for delay, but they are not themselves the final decision on the naturalisation application.

The position is different where a formal decision rejects the application with binding effect. This may also be a rejection on procedural grounds. Once such a decision has been notified before the action is brought, the prescribed route of an administrative objection or a direct action seeking an order requiring the authority to act must generally be followed. The earlier waiting time does not make the decision irrelevant and does not replace the time limits for legal remedies.

Where letters are unclear, their objective content matters. The absence of a heading saying “formal decision” does not prove that no binding determination has been made. Equally, a file reference or an announcement of fees alone does not amount to a rejection. If there is uncertainty, we examine the complete letter before identifying the appropriate legal route. The article on Rejection decisions and legal remedies explains the distinction and the steps that follow.

A sufficient reason must be capable of objectively explaining why no decision has been made in the specific proceedings. The authority must identify the factual circumstances on which it relies. The court assesses whether those circumstances justify waiting longer in light of the time already elapsed and the applicant's interests. Merely using the word “examination” or “overload” is therefore not enough.

Necessary extensive enquiries may constitute such a reason. Examples include actual contradictions in documents or an outstanding preliminary issue that is legally relevant. The investigation must, however, be focused on its purpose. A point that is not relevant to the decision must not become a permanent obstacle merely because the authority would like further information about it. Steps already taken and avoidable periods when the file was left idle must also be considered.

There is no mathematical formula under which a particular difficulty always permits a particular number of additional months. The same documentary deficiency may be assessed differently where necessary checks are demonstrably ongoing than after a long period of inactivity without further enquiries. The assessment must therefore remain tied to the current stage of the proceedings. An obstacle that existed earlier does not automatically justify every subsequent delay.

Applicants have duties to cooperate, particularly in relation to personal facts and supporting evidence. § 34 StAG refers in this respect to provisions of residence law. A person who fails without explanation to provide necessary income documents requested by the authority cannot claim the same readiness for a decision as someone who has met every specific request. The authority nevertheless remains obliged to establish the facts and give clear guidance.

If the authority relies on incompleteness, we ask specifically: which document is missing? When was it requested? What is it needed for? Has it in fact already been sent? Is obtaining it possible and reasonable? A clear response with supporting evidence can resolve a dispute about an alleged failure to cooperate. If we consider the request unjustified, we explain why and, where appropriate, propose suitable alternative evidence.

One example is a certificate requested again even though it should already be in the file. The initial issue here is locating the document or its loss, rather than further substantive cooperation. Current payslips may be different: they were not even available when the original application was made. The assessment must therefore distinguish between a repeated request for the same document and a new item of evidence relating to a later period.

The necessary involvement of other bodies can delay a decision. However, describing a response as outstanding does not in itself provide a sufficient reason for waiting indefinitely. It must be examined whether that body's involvement was necessary, when it was initiated and whether it is being followed up. The naturalisation authority cannot shift responsibility for its own proceedings entirely to another body.

A special situation arises with pending criminal investigations under § 12a paragraph 3 StAG. Here, the law generally requires suspension. This must be distinguished from a merely administrative delay. An action for failure to act does not create a power to grant naturalisation outright contrary to that statutory rule. It may, however, provide an occasion to clarify whether the proceedings cited are actually still pending.

A postponement requested by the applicant may also explain further waiting. For example, someone who expressly asks that no decision be made until particular evidence has been submitted must take that statement into account in any later action. If the proceedings are to resume, we communicate that wish clearly. Agreeing to wait for a limited period does not automatically amount to a permanent waiver of legal protection.

For organisational reasons, courts distinguish temporary exceptional pressures from a structural, enduring situation. An unforeseeable sharp increase in applications may be assessed differently for a limited period from a backlog that has existed for years. Staff shortages, holiday periods or the illness of individual employees do not relieve the administration of responsibility without limit; as a rule, it must organise itself so that its statutory tasks can be fulfilled.

The workload relied on is not a matter of attributing personal blame to individual employees. The issue is the administration's legal responsibility and the limits of how long it is reasonable to wait. We therefore substantiate your claim objectively from the procedural history, without personal accusations against staff. We set out the duration, requests already answered and the absence of specific unresolved factual issues.

Processing applications in the order received can be a sensible organisational principle. It does not, however, exclude judicial protection. If you are referred to a general queue, we examine whether that explanation still holds in your case. An authority's average processing time is not a statutory bar on bringing proceedings. A general explanation is also available under Processing times and reasons for delays.

If the court recognises a sufficient reason, § 75 sentence 3 VwGO provides for the proceedings to be stayed until a specified deadline expires. That deadline can be extended. The court therefore does not simply leave the matter on hold without oversight, but orders a defined further period for processing. A stay must be distinguished from a final dismissal of the action.

If the special requirements of § 75 are met, the general procedural requirements must still be examined. Separately, the substantive legal position determines whether the claim is well-founded: an admissible action may fail on its merits. The waiting period for bringing an action replaces neither valid representation nor a missing naturalisation requirement. To advise on court action, we therefore assess together:

• the application and its receipt;

• the sequence of events over time;

• the specific reason for the delay;

• the current naturalisation requirements.

The subsequent steps are described in the article on court proceedings and forms of decision.